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I. Introduction
For well over a decade, the pages of this
Quarterly have undoubtedly been filled with
discussions of cutting-edge drilling and
completion technologies like horizontal
drilling and massive hydraulic fracturing, as
well as the technical challenges of producing
oil and gas from unconventional reservoirs.
Engineers and geologists have indeed faced
and solved many technical and scientific
problems that had previously confounded
the development of unconventional oil and
gas resources.
Many of these advancements of engineering and geo sciences have made it feasible
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not only to efficiently extract tight oil and
gas, but also to inject incredible volumes of
substances into the pore spaces within geologic reservoirs for safe disposal and storage.
One particular application of advancing
injection technology—carbon dioxide
sequestration or storage—has taken on a
special salience in today’s public debates
about climate change mitigation policy.
This article discusses some of the problems that all these engineering solutions
have caused for the law of oil and gas. It
begins in Part II with a brief outline of how
the law slowly develops through the common law process and illustrates how that
(Continued on Page ??)
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process responds, also slowly, to rapid
technological and social changes, like
the unconventional hydrocarbon revolution. Part III then surveys how courts
have begun to reform the legal rights and
remedies in common reservoirs to
respond to the revolution. And Part IV
concludes with an observation about
what contributions the disciplines of
engineering and geology might make to
aid the law in its response, and thereby
help clean up the mess their innovations
have created.

II. The Common Law Process
and Rapid Technological
Change
Oil and gas law is mostly made by
judges through the common law process. As disputes arise between parties
and are litigated to courts, the courts are
called upon to resolve the impasse by
applying rules found in prior precedential cases. When a dispute involves a set
of circumstances not previously seen in
a precedential case, courts must reason
whether and how the principles underpinning their prior decisions apply to
this novel set of facts. The decisions in
these new cases themselves become
precedential and the process continues.
In this fashion, the common law process
grows the law incrementally over centuries but is never complete, just as
human-kind’s capacity for getting into
fights is timeless and never ending.
Since the decades following Colonel
Drake’s discovery, the body of oil and
gas law has grown very substantially to
the point that it fills volumes. Yet,
despite its depth and breadth, the law of
oil and gas has struggled to respond to
the revolution in unconventional oil and
gas development.
In particular, the law has struggled to
resolve disputes that arise between parties over the use of commonly owned oil
and gas reservoirs. For example, may
one mineral interest owner (or lessee)
hydraulically fracture a well on its property in such a manner as to send frac
fissures into the subsurface property of a
neighboring landowner and drain oil or
gas through the fissures into its own
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wellbore? Or, may an oil and gas lessee
use the subsurface of a neighboring tract
to drill a horizontal wellbore to access
the minerals under its own lease? Or, is
the operator of a saltwater disposal well
liable to a neighbor if its injected produced water migrates through the formation into the neighbor’s subsurface
property? What if the injected fluid is
hazardous chemicals or carbon dioxide,
instead?

These and similar questions have percolated through the courts of oil and gas
producing states in the past few decades.
The results in these cases have been
sufficiently varied and confusing that
prominent legal commentators have
called the law “not entirely unified or
coherent.”1 Such incoherence is common during times of great technological
change because the common law process almost always moves slower than
society. Nevertheless, legal confusion
can and often does depress investment
in the use of new technologies that could
make more efficient use of subsurface
natural resources, including the storage
capacity of pore space.
In recent memory (legally speaking),
the law had to adapt to a similar technological shift with the advent of commercial air travel. Before airplanes, the
English and American law of property
held that the owner of land owned the
soil as well as the entire column of air
above the soil, reaching to the heavens,
and the entire column of rock below the
soil, reaching to hell. This maxim is
known as the ad coelum doctrine (pronounced “add see-lum”), but is affectionately known by lawyers as the “heaven and hell doctrine.”2 Under the ad
coelum doctrine, when an airplane flies
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over a landowner’s property without the landowner’s permission, it could constitute a trespass, which would entitle the
landowner to sue to stop the overflights from occurring in the
future. The trouble this legal doctrine would cause commercial
airlines and the military is obvious: without the consent of
every landowner between the points of departure and arrival,
any route would be potentially off limits as a trespass.

As the courts began to hear “airspace trespass” cases, in
which a landowner sued another party for flying over the plaintiff’s land, they began to grapple with the practical difficulties
that the ad coelum doctrine caused for modern aerospace technology.3 After a good deal of uncertainty, courts eventually
began to modify, or refine, the ad coelum doctrine to allow for
high overflights, thereby modifying, or refining, the extent of
the legal rights associated with land ownership. The seminal
case came in United States v. Causby, in 1932, in which the
United States Supreme Court ruled that landowners have no
right to sue to stop overflights above their land, but may only
sue for damages if constant airplane overflights somehow
interfere with the owner’s ability to use and enjoy the surface
of its land.4 This has been the governing rule about ownership
and use of the airspace ever since.5

III. Refining Reservoir Rights
Like airspace rights before it, the law of subsurface reservoir
rights is undergoing a process of refinement brought about by
rapid technological and engineering innovations. The process
of refining rights and liabilities in the subsurface is substantially more complex, however, for reasons that this Quarterly’s
readership will readily appreciate. Unlike the air, the subsurface is invisible and what knowledge we have about it is confined to the realm of scientific expertise. Moreover, unlike the
airspace, reservoirs vary widely in their physical characteris-
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tics. Some are porous and permeable; some are tight; some are
water drive; some are gas drive; and etc. An additional complicating factor is the multifarious types of technological advancements being made in subsurface uses. Unlike a single use—
commercial air travel—the subsurface is increasingly capable
of a multitude of sometimes inconsistent commercial uses; for
example, horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing, natural gas
storage, waste disposal, carbon sequestration or storage, and
energy storage, to name a handful of the most common.
These physical difficulties have always helped form the
development of oil and gas law. The foundational principles of
the ownership of oil and gas reservoirs are the ad coelum doctrine—that the landowner owns all of the underlying rock and
the in-situ fluids including oil and gas—and the rule of capture. The rule of capture permits a landowner to drain oil and
gas from underneath a neighbor’s property through a well
located on the landowner’s own tract.6 In adopting the rule of
capture, early courts reasoned that the behavior and migration
of subsurface oil and gas was not well understood and that it
was practically impossible to determine from where in a reservoir oil or gas was drained into a well.7 The physical nature of
the resource, and our lack of knowledge of it, shaped the legal
rule.
The rule of capture does not permit a landowner to drill a
well into the physical boundaries of a neighboring tract to drain
oil or gas; this action would violate the ad coelum doctrine and
constitute a subsurface trespass. The rule of capture also does
not permit a landowner to damage or destroy a common reservoir or waste the oil or gas contained therein.8 On top of these
principles of the common law, of course, state legislatures have
adopted conservation laws to limit the location, spacing, and
density of new wells and the amount or rate of production
from wells.
Together with conservation statutes, this small family of
principles has formed the basis for ownership and use of oil
and gas reservoirs since the early days of the domestic industry. But their strict application to various unconventional drilling and completion techniques proves practically problematic.
For example, would the ad coelum doctrine bar the use of
hydraulic fracturing to create fractures to drain oil or gas from
a neighboring parcel of land, which could greatly limit use of
the technology, or ought trans-boundary frac fissures be
allowed under the rule of capture—which would move the law
of subsurface rights in the direction of airspace rights. In
Texas, the question was answered in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Garza Energy Trust.9 Like the Causby case did for airspace
rights, the Garza case refined the ad coelum doctrine as it pertains to the deep subsurface of the earth, such that the mere
fact that frac fissures cross a landowner’s property line is not
sufficient to establish a right to sue under trespass.
Yet, not all courts have been as willing to refine the ad coelum
doctrine to exempt deep subsurface frac fissures from trespass
(Continued)
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liability. There is, viewed from a certain perspective, a countervailing practical consideration that warrants imposing trespass liability on cross-boundary fracing. That being the difficulty small, often unsophisticated landowners have in defending themselves from an offsetting fracing operation or to
reciprocate when a more sophisticated party send frac fissures
across the line into the smallholder’s property.10
Horizontal drilling technology has generated similarly difficult questions. Consider a recent Texas Supreme Court case,
Lightning Oil v. Anadarko Onshore E&P.11 There, Anadarko had
an oil and gas lease on state lands, which restricted Anadarko
from using the surface of the land to conduct exploration and
drilling operations. Anadarko approached the landowner of
the neighboring Briscoe Ranch and purchased a surface lease
to drill horizontal wellbores from the Ranch into Anadarko’s
offsetting minerals. Lightning Oil held the oil and gas lease on
the Briscoe Ranch, and upon learning of Anadarko’s plan sued
seeking to enjoin Anadarko’s drilling operations on the Ranch.
Lightning Oil alleged that Anadarko’s wellbore would trespass
on the ad coelum defined boundaries of Lightning Oil’s leasehold interest.
Emphasizing that the wellbores would not be perforated
within Lightning Oil’s leasehold premises and that any oil or
gas destroyed in the process of drilling Anadarko’s wellbores
would be trivial, the court ruled against Lighting Oil and permitted the drilling. In rendering its decision, the court emphasized the practical importance to the oil and gas industry, and
derivatively of society itself, of enabling greater use of horizontal drilling to produce otherwise unrecoverable reserves.12
Meanwhile, other decisions, including prior decisions by
Texas courts, have held a defendant liable for trespass for penetrating a plaintiff’s subsurface with non-producing deviated
wellbores.13 Consequently, the question, like Lightning Oil’s
precise legal rationale, remains somewhat murky.
Garza and Lightning represent only two of the many emerging legal questions arising form new subsurface technologies.
Even more recently, lawyers have turned their attention to a
question that no court has yet decided: whether it would constitute a trespass to inject carbon dioxide into a subsurface
reservoir for sequestration or storage if the carbon migrates
beyond the injector’s property lines and underneath neighboring parcels of land.14 One possible analogy may be saltwater
disposal. When an operator injects produced saltwater into a
reservoir or saline aquifer for disposal, it frequently migrates
underneath the land of others, yet courts generally do not find
this to constitute a trespass absent some accompanying physical harm to the plaintiff’s land or wells. In fact, the Ohio
Supreme Court has even permitted BP Chemicals to inject
hazardous chemical wastes into a deep saline aquifer underlying hundreds of individual landowners without liability.15
These cases appear to establish yet another refinement of
the ad coelum doctrine for waste disposal that causes no physi-

AUGUST 2021

cal harm to the plaintiff’s land or wells. Until a court actually
decides a case claiming subsurface trespass from migrating
carbon dioxide, however, it is uncertain whether the rule will
cover that factual situation, or, instead, whether the carbon
injector will be liable for trespass.

IV. Conclusion: Tailoring the Legal Doctrine
to Fit Physical Realities
So how should courts decide these cases? One possible solution is to take a page from the courts that adopted the rule of
capture to decide the earliest oil and gas disputes and let the
physical realities of the subsurface resource shape the rules.
For this, lawyers and judges might be wise to turn to earth
scientists and petroleum engineers for guidance.
Based on the knowledge of the
physical situation these other
disciplines can offer, lawyers
may deduce certain principles
about subsurface rights and liabilities. For instance, we know
that oil and gas and pore space
exist within reservoirs and saline
aquifers, which are, to some
extent depending on their porosity and permeability, interconnected. We know that this means
any one owner is limited in its
ability to physically exclude others from draining oil or gas from or causing injected substances
to migrate into the boundaries of its subsurface property.
Additionally, an owner is limited (exactly how limited one
might expect an engineer to know) in its ability to monitor the
boundaries of its subsurface property to determine when and
where they have been breached by an outside invasion. We
might also say that these characteristics mean that reservoirs
are used most efficiently when the owners are coordinated
(“unitized” in the language of oil and gas law) rather than
when they compete to produce or inject into the reservoir.
As experience shows from the refinement of airspace trespass, the inherent interconnectedness of subsurface reservoirs
counsels against close adherence to rules of exclusion based on
the ad coelum and trespass doctrines.16 Indeed, this is the direction that cases like Garza and Lightning Oil seem to be taking
the law. And this development is thanks to the innovations of
countless petroleum geologists and engineers who helped
accelerate the science of oil and gas production beyond what
our legal traditions could readily accommodate.
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